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Abstract
In this paper we derive equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price
auctions with private values when bidders have outside options. We then study bidding
behaviour with the help of experiments.
We find that bidders respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge
about competitors’ outside options, though bidders in first-price auctions show more overbid-
ding with outside options than without. In second-price auctions overbidding is not affected
by outside options. As expected first-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price
auctions. This revenue-premium is higher in the presence of outside options.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, auctions have increasingly attracted attention from academia and the
wider public. A major part of this increased interest is due to growing popularity of using
auctions as market institutions for C2C and B2C transactions, allocating public resources and
procurement contracts. Cases in point are worldwide spectrum auctions, online auction plat-
forms such as eBay and Ricardo and virtual B2B market places, e.g. Covisint for the automotive
industry or Consip’s AiR for Italian public procurement offers.
Often outside options are available to bidders in addition to the object offered in the par-
ticular auction. For the purpose of illustration, suppose somebody has the opportunity to buy
a used watch either from a friend at some price or to participate in an online auction where
a similar watch is offered. The bid in the auction might depend on the value from seizing the
outside option, i.e. from buying the watch from the friend.
In this paper we augment the standard symmetric independent private value (SIPV) model
to allow for public and private outside options. We derive equilibrium bidding functions and
implement the auction in the laboratory.
To our knowledge, there is no literature on the effects of outside options on bidding behaviour.
A model with symmetric independent private valuations and independent outside options can
be reduced to a standard SIPV model.1 One special case is studied by Holt (1980) who assumes
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that valuations are constant and the same for all bidders. A related case is studied by Weber
(1983), Gale and Hausch (1994), and Reiß and Scho¨ndube (2002) who study sequential auction
models. A subsequent auction in such a sequential auction process can also be interpreted as a
specific outside option. However, in these cases the value of the outside option is endogenous.
In our paper we are focusing on the case of an exogenously given value of the outside option.
In our experiments we want to find out the following for the first-price and the second-price
auction:
• Do outside options affect bids at all?
• Do bids in the laboratory deviate from equilibrium bids in the same way as they deviate
in standard auctions without outside options?
• How are revenue and efficiency affected if outside options are present?
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we introduce outside options into the SIPV
auction model and derive equilibrium bidding strategies for the first-price and second-price
auctions, section 3 describes our experimental design, section 4 provides experimental results
and section 5 concludes.
2 The Symmetric Independent Private Values auction model
with outside options
There are n risk-neutral individuals with single-object demand. Each individual i has a valuation
vi for an object that is for sale in an auction. In addition to the auction offer each individual has
access to a transaction alternative that can be substituted for the object offered in the auction.
The value that an individual derives from executing the outside option instead of receiving
the object auctioned off is denoted by wi.
2 We assume here that receiving the auctioned object
eliminates the value of the outside option entirely. Individuals may execute their outside options
before, during or subsequently to the auction.
We distinguish between public and private outside options. With public outside options,
each individual derives the same benefit from the outside option. This is common knowledge.
In contrast, private outside options are individual-specific and private information.
We briefly report equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auction in
the SIPV model in section 2.1. In section 2.2 we introduce public outside options. In section
2.3 we extend the SIPV model to allow for private outside options.
2.1 Bidding without outside options
Suppose that individual valuations vi of the object that is offered in an auction are private infor-
mation and independently and identically distributed according to a cumulative density function
F (vi) where vi ∈ [v
¯
,v¯]. Without outside options, the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid-
ding functions for the first- and second-price auctions are well-known (e.g. Riley and Samuelson,
1981, and Vickrey, 1961): for the first-price auction we have b fp(v) = v−
∫ v
v
¯
Fn−1(x)dx/Fn−1(v)
and for the second-price auction bsp(v) = v.
2Valuations of transaction alternatives are net of transaction costs. If, for instance, an alternative object is
offered at a posted price, then wi represents the value of the outside option net of its price. If there are many
alternatives, then wi corresponds to the best alternative net of prices.
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2.2 Public outside options
This is the easy case. As in section 2.1 individual i has a valuation vi for the auctioned object.
Individual i could also execute the public outside option and obtain a value which is the same for
all individuals and equals w. We assume w ≤ v
¯
. This ensures that every individual voluntarily
participates in a standard auction.
We will use the payoff equivalence theorem to derive the equilibrium bidding functions for
the public outside option case. This can be done in a straightforward way for standard auctions.
From the bidder’s perspective the auction with public outside options can be interpreted as a
standard auction where bidders who fail to win the object receive a payment of w, thus, the
application of the payoff equivalence theorem is possible.
Following Riley and Samuelson (1981), let Π(x, v) be the expected payoff that a representa-
tive bidder with valuation v receives if mimicking valuation type x given that all competitors
adhere to the common equilibrium bidding strategy bfp-pv(v). From payment equivalence with-
out auction reserve price (cf. Riley and Samuelson, 1981, eqs. 7 and 8), we obtain immediately
the expected equilibrium payment of the representative bidder with valuation v that depends
on the expected equilibrium payoff to the lowest valuation type v
¯
:
P (v) = vFn−1(v)−
∫ v
v
¯
Fn−1(x)dx−Π(v
¯
, v
¯
). (1)
For the lowest valuation type to be indifferent between auction participation and not entering
the auction, the bidder must receive at least the outside option w in the auction, leading to the
condition Π(v
¯
,v
¯
) = w. For the first-price design with the modification that each bidder receives
w if unsuccessful in the auction, the expected equilibrium payment is given by
P (v) = Fn−1(v) bfp-pb(v)−
[
1− Fn−1(v)
]
w. (2)
Combining both expressions for expected equilibrium payment, (1) and (2), and solving
for bfp-pb(v) leads to the intuitive result that the equilibrium bid under the first-price design
with public outside option precisely matches that without public outside options reduced by the
outside option’s value:
bfp-pb(v,w) = bfp(v)− w (3)
where bfp(v) is the equilibrium bidding function in the first-price auction without outside options
defined in the preceding subsection.
The weakly dominant bidding strategy3 for the second-price auction is
bsp-pb(v,w) = v − w . (4)
Without outside options the above bidding functions always imply efficient allocations in equi-
librium. Public outside options do not destroy this property.
2.3 Private outside options
The valuation of individual i’s is, again, vi. The value from executing the outside option is wi.
Valuation pairs (v,w) ∈ [v
¯
, v¯]× [w
¯
, w¯] are independently distributed across individuals according
to the probability density function f(v,w) and are their private information. Again we assume
that the lowest valuation is not lower than any outside option, i.e. v
¯
≥ w¯ ensuring that each
individual submits a bid in the auction.
3The proof is identical to that for the equilibrium bidding strategy under the second-price auction with private
outside options, see section 2.3.
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Equilibrium bidding: first-price auction In order to derive the equilibrium bidding strat-
egy in the first-price auction, we represent the bidding model such that we can solve it with stan-
dard procedures. Consider the utility maximisation problem of the representative risk-neutral
individual i that submits bid bi in the auction and faces the outside option wi:
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (vi − bi) + [1− Pr(bi wins)] · wi (5)
This program can be rearranged to
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (vi − wi − bi) +wi (6)
Since the outside option wi is known to the individual and a constant, the argmax of that
problem is the same as the one of the following problem where the new variable xi := vi −wi is
introduced:
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (xi − bi) (7)
We interpret x ∈ [v
¯
−w¯, v¯−w
¯
] as an individual’s net valuation of the object. One way to in-
terpret the transformation of the original maximisation problem into (7) is to suppose that the
representative individual executes the outside option wi before bidding in the auction, and, in
case the auction is won (since we have single-object-demand) repays the outside option to the
price of the auctioned object.
By this simple transformation we obtain a standard bidding problem in net valuations x. All
there remains to do is to identify the probability density function that governs the distribution
of net valuations. Note that infinitely many valuation pairs (v,w) lead to the identical net
valuation x¯. The probability density function of a given net valuation x is obtained by summing
up all densities over the corresponding iso-net-valuation curve as follows
fX(x) =
min{w¯,v¯−x}∫
max{w
¯
,v
¯
−x}
f(x+ w,w) dw. (8)
Given a well-defined density function fX(x) with support [v
¯
−w¯, v¯−w
¯
] and cumulative density
function FX(x), we can invoke standard results to derive the equilibrium bidding function (e.g.
Riley and Samuelson, 1981) assuming that there is no reserve price in the auction:
bfp-pr(x) = x−
∫ x
v
¯
−w¯ F
n−1
X (y) dy
Fn−1X (x)
. (9)
By resubstitution, the equilibrium bidding function for our model is:
bfp-pr(v,w) = v − w −
∫ v−w
v
¯
−w¯ F
n−1
X (y) dy
Fn−1X (v − w)
(10)
which is strictly increasing in v and strictly decreasing in w since ∂b/∂x > 0 and ∂x/∂v =
−∂x/∂w = 1. We give an example for an equilibrium bidding function in appendix A.1.
Equilibrium bidding: second-price auction For the second-price auction without outside-
options it can be shown with a standard argument that bidding ones own valuation in the auction
is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder. Following a similar argument one also finds that
bidding ones own net-valuation xi = vi − wi is a weakly dominant strategy in the second-price
auction with outside options.
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Round: 1 of 12 Remaining time [sec]: 113
You receive 0 ECU if you make the smallest bid in an auction
The other bidder receives 0 ECU if he makes the smallest bid in the auction
Your valuation will be a number between 50 and 100
The valuation of the other bidder will be a number between 50 and 100.
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Valuation [ECU]
Bid [ECU]
b
b
b
b
b
b
Please indicate your bidding function
depending on the valuation that is still going
to be determined
For a valuation of 50 ECU I bid: 46.6
For a valuation of 60 ECU I bid: 56.26
For a valuation of 70 ECU I bid: 65.7
For a valuation of 80 ECU I bid: 76
For a valuation of 90 ECU I bid: 84.35
For a valuation of 100 ECU I bid: 92.5
Draw bids
Finish input stage
Figure 1: A typical input screen in the experiment (treatment A1, translated into English)
Efficiency with private outside options If all bidders follow the bidding function given by
equation 9 then the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest net valuation. One can
see easily that this leads to an efficient allocation.
3 Experimental design and procedures
To test the theoretical implications of public and private outside options in the SIPV model,
we use five treatments in a between-subjects design. We varied the type of outside options
(none/public/private) and the auction design (first-price/second-price). Appendix A.2 sum-
marises the treatment parameters used for each of the 19 experimental sessions. In total there
were 340 subjects. Each session required less than 90 minutes. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
Treatment types: We distinguish between three types of treatments, A, B, and C. In the
baseline treatment, A, we ran standard auction games without outside options under the in-
dependent private values assumption with two bidders where the highest bid wins. Valuations
were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support [50,100] during the experiment
and rounded to the second decimal place. The baseline treatment A used either a first-price
sealed-bid auction design (treatment A1) or a second-price sealed-bid auction (treatment A2).
There were neither minimum bids nor entry fees. Bids and valuations were denominated in
experimental currency units (ECU). Each experiment session had twelve auction rounds in the
strangers-matching design such that no subject was matched with the same subject in two
consecutive rounds.
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Strategy method: In standard auction experiments bidders first learn their payoff-relevant
valuation before they submit a bid. In our experiment we used the strategy method to elicit a
subject’s continuous bidding function. Figure 1 shows a typical input screen. We asked for bids
for six hypothetical valuations 50,60,70,80,90 and 100. Bids for intermediate valuations were
determined by linear interpolation. The interpolated bidding function was graphically displayed
at all times. Subjects were free to adjust their set of entered bids and thereby their specified bid
functions as often as they wished. Bids were entered via keyboard and had to be nonnegative,
not larger than 200, and had to have not more than two decimal places.
Related implementations of the strategy method have been used in a few other experiments.
Selten and Buchta (1999) introduced the strategy method for auction experiments. There sub-
jects could specify a piecewise linear bidding functions with up to 10 000 segments either using
a graphical input mode or via keyboard (valuations ranged between 0.00 and 100.00). Their
implementation suffered from the problem that 46% of observed bidding functions were non-
monotonic—subjects might have been drawing interesting landscapes rather than bidding func-
tions (p. 81). Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004) used a simplified version of the Selten and
Buchta (1999) implementation where subjects could specify two segments which allowed for a
single kink in the bidding schedule. In their study, approximately 15% of bidding functions are
non-monotonic in their asymmetric auction treatments and approximately 5% in their symmetric
auction treatments.4 In the experimental studies of Gu¨th et al. (2002, 2003) the set of possible
valuations was restricted to eleven values. For each of these eleven valuations, subjects had to
enter a corresponding bid. In our experiment about 10.15% of all bids are not monotonic.5 A
characteristic common to all implementations including ours is that subjects were required to
submit their bidding schedules before their valuations were drawn.
Multiple feedback: A distinctive feature of our design is that pairs of matched subjects
participated in five unrelated auctions after specification of their bidding schedules instead of
one single auction. For each of these five auctions and for each of the subjects, a valuation
was independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [50,100]. In each of the
five auctions, subjects’ bids were determined according to their specified bidding functions and
their valuations. This design feature was included to decrease the random component in income
determination and to increase its strategic component. This supports the use of theoretical
predictions based on risk-neutrality. In addition, it allows to better motivate the elicitation of
entire bidding functions for subjects.
Subjects were informed about their five valuations, their submitted bids, whether they won
the object, the price of the object, and their income in all five auctions. They were also informed
about their income for each round which was the sum of the income in the five auctions. No
information about competitor’s valuations and incomes was revealed. Since in second-price
auctions the competitor’s bid determines the price this bid was revealed in these auctions.
Outside options: Treatments B and C constitute modifications of treatment A which allow
for an outside option. The outside option was implemented as an exogenous income for the bidder
who did not win the auction. The values of these outside options were drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0, 50] and held constant for four consecutive auction rounds. The value
of the outside option was announced to each individual bidder before they specified their bidding
functions. Treatments B and C differed in the amount of information that subjects had about
their competitors’ outside options. In treatment B the outside option was public information
and the same for both bidders. In treatments C outside options were drawn independently
4The percentages are inferred from bar charts in Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004), figures 3 and 5.
5See appendix B.
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Round: 1 of 12 Remaining time [sec]: 113
You receive 0 ECU if you make the smallest bid in an auction
The other bidder receives 0 ECU if he makes the smallest bid in the auction
Your valuation will be a number between 50 and 100
The valuation of the other bidder will be a number between 50 and 100.
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Your income from all auctions in this round is 10.65 ECU
Auction 1
Your randomly determined valuation is 50.54 ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of 47.11 ECU.
You entered the smaller bid. The other bidder has made a bid of 66.76 ECU.
Your income from this auction is 0 ECU.
Auction 2
Your randomly determined valuation is 50.94 ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of 47.5 ECU.
You entered the smaller bid. The other bidder has made a bid of 69.7 ECU.
Your income from this auction is 0 ECU.
Auction 3
Your randomly determined valuation is 55.34 ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of 51.75 ECU.
You entered the larger bid.
Your income from this auction is 3.59 ECU.
Auction 4
Your randomly determined valuation is 60.85 ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of 57.06 ECU.
You entered the smaller bid. The other bidder has made a bid of 62.98 ECU.
Your income from this auction is 0 ECU.
Auction 5
Your randomly determined valuation is 97.7 ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of 90.64 ECU.
You entered the larger bid.
Your income from this auction is 7.06 ECU.
Continue with the next round
Figure 2: A typical feedback screen in the experiment (treatment A1, translated into English)
Table 1: Number of independent observations and subjects
type of outside options first-price auction second-price auction
none A1: 8 (86 subjects) A2: 6 (58 subjects)
public B1: 6 (52 subjects) –
private C1: 8 (72 subjects) C2: 8 (72 subjects)
for each bidder from a uniform distribution with support [0, 50]. This procedure was common
knowledge, though the individual values were private information.
Treatments B1 and C1 use the first-price auction, treatment C2 uses the second-price auction.
Table 1 summarises the number of independent observations and the number of subjects by
treatment.
Procedures: At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects read written instructions,
then they took a brief treatment-specific computerised quiz to ensure their familiarity with
the instructions and the experiment. Then subjects went through twelve rounds of the actual
experiment. At the end of the last auction round, subjects completed a brief computerised
questionnaire and received their earned income in cash. To compensate for the unavailable
outside option in treatments A1 and A2 subjects received in these treatments an additional
payment of 3 Euro.
Equilibrium predictions: Table 3 summarises the equilibrium bidding strategies for the
different treatments. Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate equilibrium bids.
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treatment Bayes-Nash equilibrium prediction bid range
A1 bA1(v) = 25 + v2 b
A1 ∈ [50, 75]
B1 bB1(v,w) = 25 + v2 − w b
B1 ∈ [0, 75]
C1 bC1(x) =
{
2
3x if x ∈ [0, 50]
100x2−2/3x3−250 000/3
200x−x2−5 000
if x ∈ [50, 100] bC1 ∈ [0, 50]
where x ≡ v − w
A2 bA2(v) = v bA2 ∈ [50, 100]
C2 bC2(v,w) = x, where x ≡ v − w bC2 ∈ [0, 100]
Table 2: Equilibrium bidding predictions
first-price second-price
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Figure 3: Median bids in treatments without outside options (A1 and A2)
4 Experimental results
4.1 Bids
Median bids from the treatments without outside options (A1 and A2) are shown in figure 3.
The equilibrium bid is shown as a solid line, median bids in the experiment are shown as dashed
curves in the figure. We make the standard observation: There is a substantial amount of
overbidding in the first-price auction and a smaller amount of overbidding in the second-price
auction.
Figure 4 shows median bids from the treatments with outside options (B1, C1, and C2).6
Since in these treatments bids depend on two parameters, the valuation v and the outside
option w, we use a different way to represent bids than in figure 3: The left graphs show v on
the horizontal axis and use different bands of w to show bidding. In the right graphs we show
w on the horizontal axis and use different bands of v to show bidding.7 Solid lines show the
equilibrium bid for the mean of the parameter, dashed lines show median splines through bids
in the lab for all parameter values in the corresponding band.
We see that for all three treatments shown in the figure the data is qualitatively in line with
the equilibrium bidding functions. Bids increase with the value of the valuation v and bids
decrease with the value of the outside option w.
6Since A1 is a special case of B1 (with the outside option w = 0) we include the A1 treatments in the graphs
for B1.
7The bands are constructed in the following way: The empirical distribution of the parameter is divided into
quantiles of equal size. We use three quantiles in the B1 treatment (since the number of realisations of w is
small in the B1 treatment, w ∈ {0.00, 10.51, 12.79, 14.59, 23.49, 25.82, 25.96, 37.28, 44.24, 46.07}), and we use four
quantiles in the C1 and C2 treatment. The mean value of the parameter is shown next to each curve.
8
bands of different w bands of different v
B
1
fi
rs
t-
p
ri
ce
,
p
u
b
li
c
ou
ts
id
e
op
ti
on
50 60 70 80 90
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
v
w¯ =
12.6
w¯ =
24.6
w¯ =
42.4
w¯ =
12
.6
w¯ =
24.
6
w¯
= 4
2.4
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
w
v¯ =
55
v¯ =
75
v¯ =
95
v¯ = 55
v¯ =
75
v¯ =
95
C
1
fi
rs
t-
p
ri
ce
,
p
ri
va
te
ou
ts
id
e
op
ti
on
50 60 70 80 90
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
v
w¯ =
6.7
w¯ =
20.
1
w¯ =
33.
4
w¯ =
44.
1
w¯ =
6.7
w¯
=
20
.1
w¯
= 3
3.4
w¯
=
44
.1
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
w
v¯ = 53.3
v¯ = 66.7
v¯ = 83.3
v¯ = 96.7
v¯ = 53.3
v¯ = 66.7
v¯ =
83.3
v¯ = 96.7
C
2
se
co
n
d
-p
ri
ce
,
p
ri
va
te
ou
ts
id
e
op
ti
on
50 60 70 80 90
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
v
w¯
=
5.9
w¯
=
18
.7
w¯
=
29
.8
w¯
=
43
.5
w¯
=
5.9
w¯
=
18
.7
w¯
=
29
.8
w¯
=
43.
5
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
b
w
v¯ =
53.3
v¯ =
66.7
v¯ =
83.3
v¯ =
96.7
v¯
=
53.3
v¯
=
66.7
v¯
=
83.3
v¯
=
96.7
equilibrium, experiment
To show how bids depend on v and w we show two diagrams for each treatment. In each diagram one parameter
is shown on the horizontal axis and the other parameter is shown through different bands. In the left diagram
the parameter on the axis is v, in the right diagram this is w. Different values of the other parameter (w on the
left, v on the right) are shown as curves for different bands (see footnote 7). Means of this parameter value are
shown next to the curve. Since A1 is a special case of B1 the A1 data is included in the B1 diagram.
Figure 4: Median bids in treatments with outside options
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treatment equil. value expl. var. coeff. βˆ robust σβ t P > |t|
A1 0 constant -0.116 1.801 -0.06 0.951
1
2 v 0.871 0.021 41.64 0.000
B1 0 constant 1.872 1.142 1.64 0.162
1
2 v 0.797 0.012 64.67 0.000
-1 w -0.767 0.025 -30.14 0.000
A1+B1 0 constant 1.631 1.385 1.18 0.260
1
2 v 0.843 0.017 49.37 0.000
-1 w -0.867 0.027 -31.97 0.000
Table 3: Estimation of equation (11) for the A1 and B1 case.
Treatment B1: public outside options in the first-price auction: To gain a better
understanding of bidding behaviour we regress bids b on valuations v and outside options w
following equation (11) for treatments A1 and B1 separately and jointly.
b = βvv + βww + β0 + u (11)
Since w = 0 in treatment A1 we do not estimate βw in this treatment. Calculations of standard
errors take into account that observations might be correlated within matching groups but not
across matching groups; Rogers, 1993). Regression results are summarised in table 4.1.
We find that the estimated coefficient of the public outside option value w is significantly
different from zero (two-sided t-test, p = 0.000), but with βˆw = −0.77 significantly smaller than
the equilibrium prediction βw = −1 (two-sided t-test, p = 0.000). Also the coefficient of the
valuation v is, as found in several other studies, larger in the experiment than in equilibrium
(p = 0.000).
The fact that bidders do not fully exploit their outside option is interesting in light of the
debate on the declining price anomaly.8 If this exploitation failure arises with endogenous outside
options, too, then one might expect a series of falling prices as observed in the field since bids
in the early auctions would be too high.
Treatment C1: Private outside options in first-price auctions In treatment C1 the
equilibrium bidding function is not linear. We, thus, estimate equation (12)
b = βvv + βww + β∆∆+ β0 + u (12)
where ∆ is defined as
∆ ≡ bC1(v − w)−
2
3
(v − w) . (13)
Thus, in the linear part of the bidding function ∆ is zero. For values of v and w where the equi-
librium bidding function from table 3 becomes nonlinear the value of ∆ captures the difference.
Table 4 summarises the regression results. We see that estimates for βv and βw are larger in
absolute terms than they should in equilibrium. βv is actually significantly larger (F1,7 = 15.47,
p = 0.0057), while the deviation of βw is not significant (F1,7 = 2.77, p = 0.1402). The coeffi-
cient β∆ has the correct sign, i.e. participants in the experiment may pick up the nonlinearity.
However, β∆ is significantly smaller than its equilibrium value (F1,7 = 45.53, p = 0.0003). βv is
larger in absolute terms than βw, though not significantly so (F1,7 = 2.82, p = 0.1370).
8See Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) and the references therein. For the theoretical reference solution, see
Weber (1983); for an experimental study that reproduces this phenomenon in the laboratory, see Keser and Olson
(1996).
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treatment equil. value expl. var. coeff. βˆ robust σβ t P > |t|
C1 2/3 v .8055877 .0353191 22.81 0.000
−2/3 w -.7201958 .0321798 -22.38 0.000
1 ∆ .2213714 .1153977 1.92 0.097
0 constant -1.658815 2.963631 -0.56 0.593
Table 4: Estimation of equation (12) for the C1 case.
treatment equil. value expl. var. coeff. βˆ robust σβ t P > |t|
A2 1 v .9703532 .0152585 63.59 0.000
0 constant 4.732475 1.285897 3.68 0.014
C2 1 v .92333 .0284033 32.51 0.000
−1 w -.970783 .0574175 -16.91 0.000
0 constant 8.84315 2.635614 3.36 0.012
Table 5: Estimation of equation (11) for the C2 case.
The regression results confirm what we see in the middle section of figure 4. In the first-price
auction with private outside options bidders react slightly too sensitively to their own valuation
v. This is to be expected from other first-price auctions without outside options and this leads
to some overbidding. Bidders also reduce their bids according to their outside options almost as
they should in equilibrium. In addition to the so far ‘standard’ overbidding, bidders also forget
to shade their bids when v is large and w is small. The nonlinearity in the equilibrium bidding
function which lowers equilibrium bids is not reflected in the experimental bidding function.
Treatment A2 and C2: Second-price auctions For the second-price auction we can again
estimate equation (11). Results are reported in table 5. The βv coefficients in both treatments
are not significantly different from each other (F1,13 = 2.28, p = 0.1549). Also, coefficients
are close to equilibrium values, though in the C2 treatment βv is significantly smaller than βw
(F1,7 = 7.29, p = 0.0307).
Most importantly, the estimated coefficient for the outside option value βw does not signif-
icantly differ from the equilibrium value (F1,7 = 0.26, p = 0.6265). It appears that subjects on
average fully exploit their outside option by decreasing their bid by precisely the outside option
value in second-price auctions, although they failed to do so in first-price auctions. Recall that
in treatment B1, subjects decreased bids only by 0.77 per unit of outside option value instead
of 1.00.
Outside options increase overbidding in first-price auctions To assess the impact of
outside options on overbidding we estimate the following equation for the first-price treatments:
b = βAb
eq
A + βBb
eq
B + βC
2
3
(v − w) + β∆∆+ u (14)
beqA is the equilibrium bid in the first-price auction without outside options and zero otherwise. b
eq
B
is the equilibrium bid in the first-price auction with public outside options and zero otherwise.
The term 2/3(v − w) is the linear part of the equilibrium bid in the first-price auction with
private outside options and zero in the case without outside options. ∆ is the nonlinear part
of the bidding function with private outside options as defined in equation (13) and zero in the
case without outside options. Results are given in table 6.
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equil. value expl. var. coeff. βˆ robust σβ t P > |t|
1 βA 1.056127 .0093481 112.98 0.000
1 βB 1.129079 .0319034 35.39 0.000
1 βC 1.231377 .0232246 53.02 0.000
1 β∆ .4675264 .1490796 3.14 0.005
Table 6: Estimating equation (14)
equil. value expl. var. coeff. βˆ robust σβ t P > |t|
1 βA 1.030342 .0066221 155.59 0.000
1 βC 1.053819 .0201858 52.21 0.000
Table 7: Estimating equation (15)
As expected we see overbidding in the standard case without outside options. The coefficient
βA is larger than one and significantly so.
9 But once public outside options are introduced we
observe more overbidding: The coefficient βB is significantly larger than βA.
10 Introducing
private outside options leads to even more overbidding than with public outside options: The
coefficient βC is significantly larger than βB .
11 Not only bidders in the case with private outside
options bid more than without outside options, furthermore they fail to correct for the concavity
of the bidding function: The coefficient β∆ is significantly smaller than one.
12 Since ∆ is always
negative a too small β∆ means more overbidding. It appears that the subtle difference in common
knowledge stemming from different types of outside options affects bidding behaviour.13
When we repeat this exercise for second-price auctions we find that these are less affected
by outside options. Table 7 shows estimates of equation (15) for the second-price treatments.
b = βAb
eq
A + βCb
eq
C + u (15)
We see a small but significant amount of overbidding also in the second-price auction.14 Intro-
ducing outside options in the second-price auction does, however, not further increase overbid-
ding.15
Outside options boost revenue-dominance of first-price auction Based on the revenue
equivalence theorem which also applies to the case of outside options the expected revenue for
a first-price auction equals that for a second-price auction. Since the experimental study of
Cox et al. (1982) it is well known that the first-price design generates larger revenues than
the second-price auction in the absence of outside options. Table 8 shows for the different
treatments the difference between the expected revenue given the bidding functions in the lab
and the expected revenue given equilibrium bidding functions.16 Indeed, first-price auctions
obtain a higher revenue than the second-price auctions in our experiments. The difference is
9F1,21 = 36.05, p = 0.0000.
10F1,21 = 4.82, p = 0.0396.
11F1,21 = 6.72, p = 0.0170.
12F1,21 = 12.76, p = 0.0018.
13Gu¨th and Ivanova-Stenzel (2003) report that the manipulation of common knowledge in asymmetric private
value auctions (competitor’s valuation distribution is know/unknown) ”changes behaviour only slightly and hardly
ever in significant ways.” (p. 198f.)
14The coefficient βA is significantly larger than 1 (F1,13 = 20.99, p = 0.0005).
15The coefficient βB is not significantly different from βA (F1,13 = 1.22, p = 0.2892).
16We determine the expected revenue by evaluating the bidding function for each participant and each period
100 times for a random valuation and matching the bidder as in the experiment.
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treatment excess revenue robust σˆ t P > |t|
A2 second-price no outside option 1.519887 .3717887 4.09 0.000
C2 second-price private outside option 1.31426 .9255003 1.42 0.164
A1 first-price no outside option 7.185551 .5245006 13.70 0.000
B1 first-price public outside option 10.82654 .6744602 16.05 0.000
C1 first-price private outside option 12.36949 .4828499 25.62 0.000
The table shows average excess revenue (the difference between expected revenue in the lab and the expected
revenue with equilibrium bids).
Table 8: Average excess revenue
treatment
relative
frequency
of efficient
allocations
robust σˆ 95% confidence interval
A2 second-price no outside option .875546 .0175144 .8399898 .9111022
C2 second-price private outside option .8252546 .0205445 .7835471 .8669622
A1 first-price no outside option .855562 .0071832 .8409793 .8701448
B1 first-price public outside option .8065385 .0111459 .7839112 .8291658
C1 first-price private outside option .8360185 .0153102 .8049371 .8671
Table 9: Relative frequency of efficient allocations
significant in the no-outside-option treatments A1 and A2 17 and also significant in the private-
outside-option treatments C1 and C2 18. Most importantly, the difference in revenue between
the first-price and the second-price auction increases when outside options are introduced.19
Efficiency In our auction we call an allocation efficient if the object is obtained by the bidder
with the highest net valuation. Since in all treatments bidding functions are monotonic and the
same for all bidders in the net valuation we have always an efficient allocation in equilibrium.
Before we did our experiment we suspected that with outside options the situation is more
complex, hence, we would find more inefficient allocations. This, however, does not seem to be
the case. Table 9 shows relative frequencies of efficient allocations for the different treatments.
We see that differences in efficiency are small and also not significant.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a bidding model that allows for public and private outside option and
experimentally tested its properties. A key feature of our experimental design is that we collected
entire bidding functions. We find that, in line with the theoretical prediction, higher-valued
outside options lead to less aggressive bidding (ie. lower bids) than in the first-price and second-
price auction model without outside options.
In contrast to theoretical revenue equivalence of first-price and second-price auction, our
laboratory analysis shows that the first-price auction generates larger revenue than the second-
price auction. Importantly, outside options magnify significantly the revenue-premium of the
17F1,35 = 77.66, p = 0.0000.
18F1,35 = 112.16, p = 0.0000.
19In the no-outside option treatment the revenue premium of the first-price auction is 7.19− 1.52 = 5.67 ECU
while the introduction of private outside options strongly increase it to 12.37− 1.31 = 11.06 ECU. The difference
of these revenue premia is significant, F1,35 = 19.33, p = 0.0001.
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first-price auction since overbidding in first-price auctions is more prominent with outside options
than without. There is no such effect for second-price auctions. In the private outside option
case overbidding is further increased since bidders do not take fully into account the concavity
of the bidding function.
Taken together, our analysis suggests that outside options crucially influence bidding be-
haviour in a way that is qualitatively predicted by theory and that the particular nature of
outside options matters. However, actual bidding behaviour seems to deviate from the predic-
tions in important ways.
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A Appendix
A.1 Private outside options, first-price bidding function
In this section we give an example for the equilibrium bidding function for the first-price auction
in the case with private outside options. Suppose (v,w) ∈ [50, 100]×[0, 50] with f(v,w) = 1/2 500
and n = 2. It follows that net valuations x ∈ [0, 100]. This is the parameterisation that we use
in our experiment. The cumulative density function of X ≡ V −W is given by
FX(x) =
{
x2
5 000 if x ∈ [0, 50]
200x−x2−5 000
5 000 if x ∈ [50, 100].
(16)
As a result, the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding function is given by
bfp-pr(x) =
{
2
3x if x ∈ [0, 50]
300x2−2x3−250 000
600x−3x2−15 000 if x ∈ [50, 100].
(17)
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The bidding function bfp-pr(x) is continuous at x = 50. The bidding function bfp-pr(v,w) can be
obtained by resubstitution:
bfp-pr(v,w) =
{
2
3(v − w) if (v − w) ∈ [0, 50]
300(v−w)2−2(v−w)3−250 000
600(v−w)−3(v−w)2−15 000
if (v − w) ∈ [50, 100].
(18)
A.2 List of experimental sessions
Seventeen sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory at the SFB 504 at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim in 2003 and 2004; two sessions were conducted at the MaXLab at the
University of Magdeburg in April 2005.
Date Treatment outside option auction ECU/Euro participants
20031211-18:23 A1 none first price 25 14
20031212-10:45 A1 none first price 25 14
20040519-15:53 A1 none first price 35 18
20050414-08:55 A1 none first price 35 20
20050414-13:17 A1 none first price 35 20
20031212-14:23 B1 public first price 120 18
20031212-15:53 B1 public first price 120 16
20031212-17:33 B1 public first price 120 18
20031211-10:19 C1 private first price 150 16
20031211-12:31 C1 private first price 150 18
20031211-14:25 C1 private first price 150 20
20031211-16:17 C1 private first price 150 18
20041130-17:41 A2 none second price 35 20
20041201-14:09 A2 none second price 35 20
20041201-15:57 A2 none second price 35 18
20041129-10:27 C2 private second price 150 20
20041129-15:29 C2 private second price 175 16
20041130-10:43 C2 private second price 175 18
20041130-15:59 C2 private second price 175 18
B Monotonicity of observed bidding functions
A1 B1 C1 A2 C2 all
strictly decreasing 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.02%
weakly decreasing 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.15%
constant 0.2% 3.1% 2.7% 0.4% 1.0% 1.37%
weakly increasing 6.7% 3.9% 6.4% 4.2% 3.9% 5.17%
strictly increasing 82.7% 84.1% 80.9% 86.8% 82.3% 83.14%
nonmonotonic 10.5% 8.8% 10.0% 8.6% 12.6% 10.15%
total number 1 032 624 864 696 864 4 080
Every bidding function is classified only once. A bidding function is classified as ”weakly in-
creasing” if it had at least one horizontal segment but less than five.
C Conducting the experiment and instructions
Participants were recruited by email and could register for the experiment on the internet. At
the beginning of the experiment participants drew balls from an urn to determine their alloca-
tion to seats. Being seated participants then obtained written instructions in German. These
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instructions vary slightly depending on the treatment. In the following we give a translation of
the instructions.
After answering control questions on the screen subjects entered the treatment described
in the instructions. After completing the treatment they answered a short questionnaire on
the screen and where then payed in cash. The experiment was done with the help of z-Tree
Fischbacher (1999).
C.1 General information
You are participating in a scientific experiment that is sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (German Research Foundation). If you read the following instructions carefully then
you can — depending on your decision — gain a considerable amount of money. It is, hence,
very important that you read the instructions carefully.
The instructions that you have received are only for your private information. During the
experiment no communication is permitted. Whenever you have questions, please raise
your hand. We will then answer your question at your seat. Not following this rule leads to
exclusion from the the experiment and all payments.
During the experiment we are not talking about Euro, but about ECU (Experimental Currency
Unit). Your entire income will first be determined in ECU. The total amount of ECU that you
have obtained during the experiment will be converted into Euro at the end and payed to you
in cash. The conversion rate will be shown on your screen at the beginning of the experiment.
C.2 Information regarding the experiment.
Today you are participating in an experiment on auctions. The experiment is divided into
separate rounds. We will conduct 12 rounds. In the following we explain what happens in each
round.
In each round you bid for an object that is being auctioned. Together with you another partici-
pant is also bidding for the same object. Hence, in each round, there are two bidders. In each
round you will be allocated randomly to another participant for the auction. Your co-bidder in
the auction changes in every round. {The following sentence was only included in the instruc-
tions for A1, B1, and C1: The bidder with the highest bid obtains the object. If bids are the
same the object will be allocated randomly.}
{The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for A2 and C2:
In each round you submit your maximum bid for an object that is auctioned. The maximum bid
is the largest amount that you want to pay for the object. Your co-bidder submits his maximum
bid for the object at the same time as you do. In the auction, the price for the object will
be increased in steps of 0.01 ECU. As soon as the price matches one of both maximum bids
(either yours or that of your co-bidder), the corresponding player stops bidding in the auction.
The bidder who remains alone in the auction obtains the object. Thus, the bidder with the
higher maximum bid obtains the object. The price is equal to the lower maximum
bid. In case you or your co-bidder stop bidding at the same time, the bidder who obtains the
object is randomly determined.}
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For the auctioned object you have a valuation in ECU. This valuation lies between 50 and 100
ECU and is randomly determined in each round. From this range you will obtain in each
round new and random valuations for the object. The other bidder in the auction also
has a valuation for the object. The valuation that the other bidder attributes to the object is
determined by the same rules as your valuation and changes in each round, too. All possible
valuations of the other bidder are also in the interval from 50 to 100 from which also your
valuations are drawn. All valuations between 50 and 100 are equally probable. Your valuations
and those of the other player are determined independently. You will be told your valuation in
each round. You will not know the valuation of the other bidder.
[ The following three paragraphs were only inserted in the instructions for treatments B1, C1,
and C2:
The auction income is calculated as follows:
• {B1 and C1: The bidder with the higher bid obtains the valuation he had for the object
in this auction added to his account minus his bid for the object.} {C2: The bidder who
remains alone in the auction obtains the valuation he had for the object in this auction
added to his account minus the price of the object. The price is given by the smaller one
of both maximum bids, ie. the price at which one of the bidders stops bidding.}
• {B1: The bidder with the smaller bid obtains a payment that both bidders are} {C1: The
bidder with the smaller bid obtains a randomly determined payment that he is} {C2: The
bidder that first stops bidding in the auction obtains the randomly determined payment
that he is} informed about before. The determination of this payment is explained further
below.
At the beginning of each round, you are informed about the payment {B1: that is obtained by
the bidder who does} {C1,C2: that you obtain if you do} not receive the object in that round.
The value of this payment will be randomly determined and remains constant for four rounds.
Thus, you are assigned a new randomly determined value for the payment after four
rounds. {B1: This payment is identical for you and your co-bidder. For the value of this
payment, all values in the range of 0 and 50 ECU are equally probable.} {C1,C2: This randomly
determined payment can be any value in the range of 0 and 50 ECU with equal probability. Also
the other bidder is assigned such a payment. That will be determined according to the same
rules as your payment. You are not informed about the payment of the other bidder.
Your payment and the payment of the other bidder are independent of one another.} ]
C.2.1 Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure is the same in each round and will be described in the following.
Each round in the experiment has two stages.
1. Stage
In the first stage of the experiment you see the following screen:20
20This figure does not show the bidding function in the graph and the specific bids that would be shown during
the experiment. Figures are slightly treatment dependent.
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Round: 1 of 12 Remaining time [sec]: 113
You receive 0 ECU if you make the smallest bid in an auction
The other bidder receives 0 ECU if he makes the smallest bid in the auction
Your valuation will be a number between 50 and 100
The valuation of the other bidder will be a number between 50 and 100.
0
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50 60 70 80 90 100
Valuation [ECU]
Bid [ECU]
Please indicate your bidding function
depending on the valuation that is still going
to be determined
For a valuation of 50 ECU I bid:
For a valuation of 60 ECU I bid:
For a valuation of 70 ECU I bid:
For a valuation of 80 ECU I bid:
For a valuation of 90 ECU I bid:
For a valuation of 100 ECU I bid:
Draw bids
Finish input stage
At that stage you do not know your own valuation for the object in this round.
{B1: The payment that the bidder with the smaller bid obtains} {C1,C2: The payment that
you obtain if you do not receive the object} {B1,C1,C2: is displayed on the screen.} On the
right side of the screen you are asked to enter a {A1,B1,C1: bid} {A2,C2: maximum bid}
for six hypothetical valuations that you might have for the object. These six hypothetical
valuations are 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 ECU. Your input into this table will be shown in the
graph on the left side of the screen when you click on {A1,B1,C1: “draw bids”} {A2,C2: “draw
maximum bids”}. In the graph the hypothetical valuation is shown on the horizontal axis, the
{A1,B1,C1: bids} {A2,C2: maximum bids} are shown on the vertical axis. Your input in the
table is shown as six points in the diagram. Neighbouring points are connected with a
line automatically. These lines determine your {A1,B1,C1: bid} {A2,C2: maximum bid} for
all valuations between the six points for those you have made an input. For the other bidder
the screen in the first stage looks the same and there are as well {A1,B1,C1: bids} {A2,C2:
maximum bids} for six hypothetical valuations. The other bidder can not see your input.
2. Stage
The actual auction takes place in the second stage of each round. In each round we will play
not only a single auction but five auctions. This is done as follows: Five times a random
valuation is determined that you have for the object. Similarly for the other bidder five
random valuations are determined. You see the following screen:21
21This figure does not show the bidding function in the graph and the specific bids, gains and losses that would
be shown during the experiment. Figures are slightly treatment dependent.
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Round: 1 of 12 Remaining time [sec]: 113
You receive 0 ECU if you make the smallest bid in an auction
The other bidder receives 0 ECU if he makes the smallest bid in the auction
Your valuation will be a number between 50 and 100
The valuation of the other bidder will be a number between 50 and 100.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
50 60 70 80 90 100
Valuation [ECU]
Bid [ECU]
Your income from all auctions in this round is . . . ECU
Auction 1:
Your randomly determined valuation is . . . ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of . . . ECU.
You entered the larger bid.
Your income from this auction is . . . ECU.
Auction 2:
Your randomly determined valuation is . . . ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of . . . ECU.
You entered the larger bid.
Your income from this auction is . . . ECU.
Auction 3:
Your randomly determined valuation is . . . ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of . . . ECU.
You entered the smaller bid. The other bidder has made a bid of . . . ECU.
Your income from this auction is . . . ECU.
Auction 4:
Your randomly determined valuation is . . . ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of . . . ECU.
You entered the smaller bid. The other bidder has made a bid of . . . ECU.
Your income from this auction is . . . ECU.
Auction 5:
Your randomly determined valuation is . . . ECU.
According to your entered bidding function you make a bid of . . . ECU.
You entered the larger bid.
Your income from this auction is . . . ECU.
Continue with the next round
For each of your five valuations the computer determines your {A1,B1,C1: bid} {A2,C2: maxi-
mum bid} according to the graph from stage 1. If a valuation is precisely at 50, 60, 70, 80, 90,
or 100 the computer takes the {A1,B1,C1: bid} {A2,C2: maximum bid} that you gave for this
valuation. If a valuation is between these points your {A1,B1,C1: bid} {A2,C2: maximum bid}
is determined according to the joining line. In the same way the {A1,B1,C1: bids} {A2,C2:
maximum bids} of the other bidder are determined for his five valuations. {A1,B1,C1: Your bid
is compared with the one of the other bidder. The bidder with the higher bid has obtained the
object.} {A2,C2: In each of the five auctions the price at which one bidder stops bidding will
be determined from your maximum bid and the maximum bid of your co-bidder. The price is
equal to the smaller one of both maximum bids. The bidder who remains alone in the auction
obtains the object.}
Your income from the auction:
For each of the five auctions the following holds:
• {A1,B1,C1: The bidder with the higher bid obtains the valuation he had for the object in
this auction added to his account minus his bid for the object.} {A2,C2: The bidder who
remains alone in the auction obtains the valuation he had for the object in this auction
added to his account minus the price of the object. The price is given by the smaller one
of both maximum bids, ie. the price at which one of the bidders stops bidding.}
• {A1: The bidder with the smaller bid obtains no income from this auction.} {B1 and
C1: The bidder with the smaller bid obtains the randomly determined payment that [B1:
is used in this round.] [C1: he is informed about.]} {A2,C2: That bidder that first stops
bidding in the auction obtains} {A2: no income from this auction.} {C2: the randomly
determined payment that he is informed about.}
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Your total income in a round is {A1,A2: the sum of the ECU income from those auctions
in this round where} {A1: you have made the higher bid.} {A2: you were the only
remaining bidder in the auction.}
{The following box was only inserted in the instructions for treatments B1, C1, and C2:}
For each of the five auctions where you {B1,C1: submitted the higher bid:}
{C2: were the only remaining bidder:}
Your valuation in this auction minus {B1,C1: your bid} {C2: the price}
+
For each of the five auctions where you {B1,C1: submitted the smaller bid:}
{C2: stopped first bidding in the auction:}
{B1: The} {C1,C2: Your} randomly determined payment used in this round.
This ends one round of the experiment and you see in the next round again the input screen
from stage 1.
At the end of the experiment your total ECU income from all rounds will be converted into
Euro and paid to you in cash.
Please raise your hand if you have questions.
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